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Abstract 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the various fautte that can arise daring operation of a process 
plant, some will be relatively harmless, while others can lead to 'loss of 
production', 'damage to valuable plant components', 'injury to persons* etc. 
Activities associated with the planning, bnildmg. and operation thus include 
precautions against faults, so that the probability of variant fault conae-
qaencea to acceptable. 
Examples of sneh protection activities are plamiiwg of fault detection 
sad protection system«! planning of teats, inspection, and supervision; 
preparation of working instructions; and Implementation of training and 
emergency exercises. 
There are many eases of insufficient or faulty protection measures, or 
lack of protection, particularly when the plant ia complicated or »»traditional. 
When smch plants are planned, consideration must be given not only to safety 
rules, norms, and precedares, bat also to special plant conditions. Potential 
risk should be evaluated as part of a larger analysis of operations. 
In a well designed plant, the probability of an incident or accident tends 
to be inversely related to the associated risk, and when dealing with the 
prediction of drastic consequences - as ia safety analysis - great consideration 
should be given to the basic assumptions of the analysis, e. g. the influence 
from the human element of the system (Rasmussen (1)). A thorough analysis 
of risks demands co-ordinated collaboration between specialists from different 
fields. For example, engineer« dealing with control and instrumentation must 
have access to detailed knowledge of the proces« itself, hereunder especially 
the chemical and physical properties of the converted materials, both under 
normal and abnormal operating conditions; and of the material« of plant 
construction. 
Swfft technological developments have implied that the designer can 
implement new system solutions with far more freedom than earlier. As a 
result he often has need for systematic and thorough decision-making to 
supplement the gradual accumulation of experience possible with traditional 
systems. To a certain extent, nils nssd is filled by existing formalised 
methods, for example 'failure mode rad effects analysis' (FMEA), 'fault 
tree analysis', or 'sneak circuit analysis' (Rankin (2)). Some such techniques -I-
have been formalised to such an extent that computer-aid can be obtained. 
R. Taylor (3) presented a semi-automatic method for failure mode and effects 
analysis. Fussel (4) presented a formal method for constructing hardware 
-oriented fault trees for electrical systems. Powers (5) outlined a formal 
technique for safety analysis of chemical processes. 
The user of a completed plant will largely Judge its reliability perform-
ance on the costs resulting from faults in terms of loss of production, damage 
to plant, or injuries to staff. It is therefore important to develop systematic 
methods for cause-consequence analysis, relating the potential modes of 
failure to the ultimate consequences for the system. 
For such failure/consequence analysis, the so-called cause-consequence 
chart (CCC) provides the engineer with both an analysis strategy, and a 
notation for presentation and documentation. 
The CCC method is baaed upon the fact that the paths from several in-
dependent fault events pass to their consequences through focal nodes rep-
resenting 'focal events', which very often have been identified during plant 
design. The 'focal events', therefore, will generally release some accident 
-preventing or -limiting action. By selecting expedient 'critical events' as 
'focal events' a cause search, as well as a consequence search, will be 
facilitated in a systematic way. 
Besides being used in connection with cause and consequence identification, 
the CCC offers a systematic support for probabilistic modelling (Nielsen 
and Runge (6)). 
PRINCIPLES AND NOTATION 
I • Starting the AnalysiB 
On the highest level (plant level) the purpose of systematic cause-conse-
quence analysis is to relate potential modes of fr -lure of individual components 
to the ultimate consequences for the system ('loss of production', 'plant 
damage', etc.). In starting the analysis, however, the following question 
•rises: What is an expedient starting point ? 
Starting the analysis with an arbitrary choice of an 'independent' poten-
tial fault, which does not directly affect the process, is inexpedient. Other 
faults may lead to the same consequences or the consequences may be harm-
less. A great deal of work may be wasted in this way. The potential number 
of trivial failures in a large process plant is very large. 
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A fwailimal taimre watch sums to he critical, or is known to be critical, 
may be thura as taw stsi I keg paint for a search in which the potential cansi« 
of me event, and the piitsnllal rnawssaimis. are sought. 
The as signer often copes with several critical events by designing pro-
tective actions ('designed protective actions') which first occur when important 
process parameter limits are exceeded. This means that it may in some 
cases be ixpirttsm* to start by selecting an event which is specified as I) a 
radical abnormal change of a process parameter, e.g. feed water flow stops, 
or 2) a process variable exeseds a safety limit, e. g. 'pressure exceeds trip 
Starting with a change of a vital parameter, a cause search is Initiated 
to lind appropriate critical events. The cause-consequence analysis then 
precedes from these critical events, unless it is evident that the identified 
critical events affect the process in nearly the same way. In the latter case, 
the parameter change itself, rather than any critical event, may be used as 
a starting point of the analysis. 
The ability of the plant to meet and subdue excessive transients is 
largely determined by systems which 'as mentioned' are designed to perform 
accident preventing actions ('designed protective actions'). In this way 
undesired event sequences are pre vented. However, a desired intervention 
may fail ('designed protective action x does not occur as intended') or it may 
not have bean possible to design an intervention action at all. In such eases 
one must rely on accident-limiting systems (barriers, springier systems, 
evacuation, etc.). 
2. .The Causa-Conseqaonce Cbart 
The display format asvd in connection with cause-consequence analysis (baaed on the concept of critical eveate) is 
ajliihsla shown in appendix). 
A CCC for a critical event describes the 
Me different possible event sequences 
CCC for a critical event in some process 
the canse-consesjaeace chart {see 
a of the critical event and 
it to it. The structure of a 
m could be as shown in fig. I. 
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A pump ayatam consisting of two 100* fall-load capacity pomps, one being 
a staadbgr, may fail so flat an Imam lent process Bow atop*. The critical 
mat la >amp system fail«". 
la the eoasiiuaenta chart (below the focal node representing the critical 
event in fig. 1) different naasihli event sequences ara described. Often a 
critical event can load to different event sequences that may depend on eon-
ditionswitlan the procees system; in fig. I it ia indicated mat different event 
aeenoacee can oeoar if, for instance, ana or mora of the accident-preventing 
actions {'ilaniajaiil aafety actions') does not oeear aa intended. As the con-
stquance chart provides the possibility for displaying the logical conaection 
between innls and conditio«, different event sequences can be ayatemaUcally 
identifisd. 
Aa advantage of preaantlng sequences of events in a CCC ia that the analyst 
is invited to etady sequence. The eeqaance of events can be followed along the 
different paths in tint block diagram. 
Several cause charts may be attached to a consequence chart. A cause 
chart may be attached to describe possible ceases of the critical event, i.e. 
the alternative prior sequences of events which can lead to the critical event, 
aad the caaatttiana wader which these aoausnesa can occur. In thia way a focal 
node, net mining the critical event, will appear in the chart. The inttlatinc 
events which can load to she critical event ahaald be traced so far back that 
they can be considered aa awsilaaeiaia and can be severed by statistical data. 
Other canst charts attached to the canasanenei chart may be conventional 
fault trees, expressing the combination of conditions under which a certain 
event sequence in the c one I quanta chart can take place. 
Provided that the 'basic inputs' of the cause charts are independent, then 
the CCC displays ths logical connection between a set of independent faults 
and their consequences. 
Aa a CCC for a critical event describes one or more sequences of events, 
the time dimension is introduced in the chart. This provides, of coarse, the 
possibility of taking into account random faults that may occur in the time 
following the occurrence of the critical event; often a system with accident 
-limiting function is required to operate for a certain period (e. g. an emerg-
ency core cooling system in a nuclear reactor). The various 'independent' 
on-line faults of component* that may occur during this period can be displayed 
in the consequence chart itself, or in an attacked cause chart (i.s. a CCC can - 6-
cope with more operating phases of a system). 
For a given limited system within a plant, thorough cause-consequence 
analyses will 'generate' a set of CCC's. The outputs of On CCC's for the 
system are significant consequences affecting the greater whole of which the 
system is a part (e. g. effect on production and economy). 
Individual outputs from one or more CCC's for a given limited system 
may be the same specific consequence ('explosion in ....', 'no light', etc.), 
or may belong to the same category of consequences (e. g. various degrees of 
•damage to system part x', or different duration of forced outage time'). 
Outputs from CCC's for a given limited system (or more limited systems) 
can tterefore be inputs of cause charts for relevant critical events which 
disturb balances outside the system(s). This indicates the hierarchical struc-
ture of CCC's (consider, e. g. fig. 1 where the critical event 'pump system 
fails' is the output of a CCC for the pump system). 
CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS BASED ON 
THE CONCEPT OF CRITICAL EVENTS 
A goal in all techniques of safety and reliability analysis is to pro/ide a 
systematic procedure. The problem for safety analysis is especially difficult 
because the dynamic relationships between process parameters, and their 
transient effects on plant components are important; also event sequences of 
low probability, but with serious potential consequences, make the analysis 
much more complex. 
The basic material for cause-consequence analysis is the plant hardware 
description in the form of functional system diagrams and flow sheets. These 
must be supplemented by physical layout drawings, observation of the actual 
hardware layout if this is possible, and with experience of component behaviour, 
especially in the later stages of the analysis. The formal requirements can 
be listed as follows: 
1, Interconnection of plant components, 
2. Location of systems, i.e. process components, systems with accident 
-preventing or -limiting functions, and auxiliary systems such as power, 
lubrication, cooling supplies, etc., 
3. Operating modes of systems. 
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4. Normal operating conditions for cask component (in each mode) together 
with component limits for static and transient pressure, temperature, 
stress, and radiation loading, 
5. Main process variables, 
t. Energy sources sad their location, 
7. Physical and chemical properties of species under normal as well as 
abnormal operating conditions. 
A review of the necessary detailed information of this kind for nuclear 
plant is presented by Garrick (T) and for chemical plant by Powers et al. (S). 
Assume that this necessary information is available. Assume further 
that a dynamic model of the plant is available at least at the intuitive level. 
Some of the main steps in cause-consequence analysis are then: 
1. Select a critical event (valid for a relevant operating mode). 
Recall of the definition of a critical event: a critical event is an unintended 
function of a component directly controlling or affecting main energy or 
mass balances, which can lead to significant consequences; or a breach 
of an energy or mass retaining boundary, which can lead to significant 
consequences. 
When selecting a critical event within the boundaries of a certain 
process system it is assumed that no other critical event has occurred 
within the system. Furthermore, it is assumed that the critical event 
will not occur due to normal operating effects from process parameters 
(pressure, temperature). 
2. Modify the dynamic model taking the critical event into account, see 
fig. 2. 
3. Specify the changes/transients (delay and magnitude) of the main process 
parameters at locations where there are protective devices or parts of 
protective devices (safety valves, sensors, etc. ). 
3a. Which trip limits/set points are exceeded 1 
4. Are loading limits for relevant process components exceeded by effect« 
from process parameter chsnges/trsnsisnts ? 
If so, a significant consequence may be another critical event, see fig. 2. mm 
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5. Identify the en»iioninontal chanfta within relevant areas, each aa pressure 
/temperature/radiation chances, missile potentials, flooding, escape of 
species and perhaps phase change* of these. 
A consequence of environmental changes may be a critical event in other 
structurally and operationally separate process systems. 
5a. Identify potentiel transgression of trip limits/set points (doe to environ-
mental changes) at locations outside the main process where there are 
protective devices or parts of protective devices (safety valves, sensors, 
etc.) 
5b. Are conditions present for fire/explosion in cue of escaped species ? 
(e.g. temperature )Tj, pressure )P,, concentration )C,, and presence 
of ignition source). 
If so, what are the potential, significant consequences ? ("damage to --, 
'injury to staff'). 
5c. Identify accident-limiting barriers, if any, designed to cope with environ-
mental changes. 
5d. Do the environmental pressure and/or temperature changes/transients 
exceed the specified loading limits for the individual accident-limiting 
barriers, if any ? 
If so, what are the potential, significant consequences ? 
6. Identify which 'designed protective actions' (i.e. accident-preventing 
or -limiting actions) are potential according to the answers to items 
3a and 5a ? 
In this connection it should be realized that: 
a) a designed protective action can, if released, be 'desirable' as well 
as •undesirable' in the context of the actual accident situation. 
b) a desirable designed protective action may fail (i. e. designed pro-
tective action x does not occur as intended). 
7. Construct a consequence chart which shows the potential combinations of 
'released' and 'not released' designed protective actions, see fig. 2. 
8. For each combination Identified in item 7 modify the dynamic model 
taking into account other critical events, if any (see item «). 
9. For each of the identified potential accidents specify the changes/transients - 10 -
of main process parameters (pressure, temperature) in relevant proces« 
components (systems). 
10. The following applies to each of the identified, potential accidents: 
Are loading limits for relevant process components exceeded by effects 
from process parameter changes/transients ? 
If ao, what are the potential, significant consequences ? ('damage to --', 
•escape of ', injury to ). 
11. Continue the consequence search, if relevant, otherwise go to item 12. 
12. Are significant consequences identified ? 
If so, then proceed to item 13, otherwise go to item 1. 
13. Identify the potential causes of the critical event. 
13a. If the critical event is a failure mode of a 'static' component (pipe-line, 
flange, vessel, etc.), then: 
Identify the potential influences of other structurally and operationally 
separate systems (e. g. effects of cranes, missiles, flooding, pressure, 
temperature, vibration, etc.). 
13b.If the critical event is a failure mode of an 'active' component (e.g., 
'control valve x closes', or 'pump x fails') then: 
Identify the relevant, functionally related units and their locations. 
For each unit identify the relevant failure mode and the possible environ-
mental effects which may cause it. 
13c. Display the result in a cause chart with reference to relevant information. 
14. Determine whether the individual system, which ia called upon to perform 
a desirable accident-preventing or -limiting action, ia capable of coping 
with the critical event, aasuming that no faults in the system have oc-
curred or occur during accident conditions. For instance, is the response 
time of the system adequate ? 
If so, then proceed to item 14a. 
14a. Ideatify the potential 'in-system' causes of the failure 'designed protective 
action x does not occur as intended' (e. g., an 'unannounced' basic fault 
event has occurred). 
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14b. Identify environmental effect« that may cauae the failure 'designed pro-
tective action a does not occur aa intended' during the course of an ac-
cident (e.g. influences of missiles, fire, flooding, humidity, temperature, 
pressure, radiation, vibration, etc.). Here there ia a problem .of ident-
ifying the causative factors of 'common mode failure', i. e. simultaneous 
failure of multiple unit« (e. g. redundant units) due to a common cause. 
14c. Display the result in a cause chart with reference to relevant information. 
15. Redesign, if necessary. 
1«. Go to item 1, if relevant, otherwise go to item IT. 
17. Repeat the procedure for other structurally and operationally separate 
process systems within the plant. 
PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 
An Assessment of the probability of significant plant hazards may be 
highly desirable. A necessary basis for probabilistic analyses is that 1) 
thorough cause-consequence analyses have been performed, and that 2) the 
ability of 'safety systems' to cope with the various critical events have been 
substantiated during the analysis. 
The probabilistic modelling techniques deal with component faults that 
can be considered as spontaneous and can be covered by significant statistical 
data. The effect of repair and test policy can be taken into account, if relevant. 
In connection with probabilistic failure modelling the CCC provides a sys-
tematic method of documentation (8). 
EXAMPLES 
Example I 
Fig. 3 shows an example of a simple process system in which light is 
produced. When the Switch is closed, the relay contact closes and the contact 
of the circuit breaker opens. If the relay contact transfers open, the light 
will go out and the operator will 'immediately' open switch 8 which in turn r^5S*fS3*'
,f
! -""%?' 
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Fig. 3. System example. 
causes the circuit breaker contact to close and restore the light. This ex-
ample was used by Fussell (9) to demonstrate a method for obtaining the 
correct set of minimal cut-sets from a fault tree in which mutually exclusive 
faults appear. {A minimal cut-set in a fault tree is a collection of primary 
failures all of which are necessary and sufficient to cause system failure by 
that minimal cut set. A complete set of minimal cut-sets are all the unique 
failure modes for a given aystem and TOP event (Fussell (9)). Fussell pointe 
out that unless accounUng properly for mutually exclusive faults that »opear in 
the domain of the »ame AND-gate, erroneous minimal cut-sets can result. 
The system example in fig. 3 is used here to illustrate/under non-dynamic 
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conditions, the procedure of cause-consequence analysis based on the concept 
of critical events. 
In the normal operating mode of the system circuit paths A and C are 
•active
1 and the vital process parameters are: 
*) einf in circuit path A, and 
2) emf in circuit path C. 
The procedure of a cause-consequence analysis related to circuit path 
A can be summarized to: 
1. Identify vital components in circuit path A. 
2. Select a critical event. 
3. Identify designed protective action, if any. 
4. Construct a consequence chart which shows the sequence of events, and 
if relecant, focuses upon the failure 'designed protective action does not 
occur'. 
5. Identify significant consequence. 
Go to item 1, if relevant, otherwise go to item 6. 
6. Identify, if relevant, causes of the failure 'designed protective action 
does not occur'. 
Following this procedure we get three CCC's for the critical events h, 
i, and a, see fig. 4. The designer has coped with event a by designing the 
protective action 'circuit breaker contact closes'. The causes of the failure 
'circuit breaker contact does not close'are f and g. 
The same procedure of analysis can be used for circuit path C. It seems, 
however, in this case more expedient to start the analysis by selecting the 
event 'emf removed from circuit path C. The procedure is then: 
1. Ic ntlfy designed protective action, if any. 
2. Construct a consequence chart which shows the sequence of events, and, 
if relevant, focuses upon the failure 'designed protective action does not 
occur'. 
3. Identify significant consequence. 
4. Identify vital components in circuit path C. - 14 -
<^ ».NM y 
fio i CCC for sysnm cmmpl* m Fif 3 
5, Identify causes of the focal event 'emf removed from circatt path C, 
i.e. identify the critical events in circuit path C. 
6. Identify, if relevant, causes of the failure designed protective action 
dees not occur'. 
Following this procedure we get a single CCC which in fact is a combi-
nation of four CCC's for individual critical events which are b, c, d, and e. 
The designer ha* coped with the focal event 'emf removed from circuit path 
15-
Fif. %. Fa« «*• far Htm n»nu in Fl» J - IS-
C' by the same protective action, i.e. 'circuit breaker contact closes'. The 
cause of the failure 'circuit breaker contact does not close" is g. 
The total chart in fig. 4 can be considered as a CCC for the system in 
fig. 3 (in fact the chart is a combination of seven CCC's for individual criti-
cal events which are h, i, a, b, c, d, and e). 
The Boolean expression for the corresponding fault tree is 
h + i + a- (f + g) + g • (b + c + d + e). see fig. 5. 
(Wefind no erroneous minimal cut-sets in the tree. When using conventional 
fault tree analysis with the same system the mutually exclusive faults f and 
e will appear in the domain of the same AND-gate). 
When analysing a 'twe-state-type system', as that in fig. 3 or, for in-
stance, a sequential control system, it is practical first to construct a func-
tional diagram of the system. By using CCC-symbols for this purpose the 
consequence chart(s) for the system is almost 'automatically' generated. In 
the next example this is illustrated for a complex sequential control system. 
Example 2 
Consider fig. 1 where the event 'pump system fails' is a critical event 
in some process system. The cause chart for this critical event is a CCC for 
the pump system consisting of two 100% full-load capacity pumps, one being 
a standby. In the CCC for the pump system the focal event 'operating unit 
fails' is a critical event for the pump system. The designed protective action 
is 'standby starts' . 
An evaluation of the probability that 'standby fails starting' on demand 
may be relevant in connection with an assessment of the probability of sig-
nificant plant hazards. A thorough analysis of the conditions for a failing 
start-up must then be performed, i. e. a cause search is required for ident-
ifying, for instance component fault modes that can be considered as spon-
taneous and cun be covered by statistical data. Such strict analysis require-
ments are, however, normally unnecessary in, e.g. analyses of alternative 
system designs aiming at an economical optimal solution. (In such preliminary 
analyses it is usually reasonable to ignore possible environmental effects on 
the components and assume similar operating conditions for the systems). 
The example to be considered here is related to the latter category of analysis, 
and stems from some analyses which have been carried out for alternative 
- 1T-
boiler feed pumps systems. 
Caw ot the systems that was analysed is a system with two 100% full-load 
capacity pumps, one being a standby. Each pump is provided with a leak-ofr 
system and is driven by a slip ring motor with a liquid rheostat connected to 
the rotor. 
The principle of the automatic sequential control system for start-up and 
shut-down of a pump group is shown in fig. 6. The pump groups are controlled 
by a master controller; if a running pump group fails, the master controller 
demands start-up of the standby and, provided that the plant criteria are 
fulfilled, the main motor is switched in. 
Each pump runs for one week and is then shut down for one week. In the 
shut-down period maintenance of slip rings and the slip ring house is carried 
out. If a demand occurs during this period, the maintenance is interrupted 
and the standby is re-established. 
In order to identify causes of 'standby fails starting' it is expedient first 
to construct a functional diagram showing all the 'designed events' that are 
established to carry out the designed protective action 'standby starts'. In so 
doing the various vital functional units and components, often shown in several 
complex electrical diagrams, can be systematically identified. By using CCC 
-symbols when constructing the functional diagram a consequence chart is 
generated at the same time, see fig. 7. 
The next step in the analysis is then to identify the causes of a failing 
start-up. 
The causes of a failing start-up can be divided into two categories -
those that occur or appear during the start-up phase itself, and those that 
have already taken place before demand. As far as the latter cate ;ory is 
concerned there may sometimes be a 'dead time' during the scheduled shut 
-down period of a pump in which the pump, i.e. the standby, is incapable 
of being started because of: 
1. Presence of an unannounced fault. 
2. Scheduled maintenance during the standby period of a pump. 
or because it is undergoing: 
3; Repair of a announced fault (mainly faults in operating lubrication and 
cooling systems). - 18 
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4. Repaii of an unannounced fault that is disclosed by the scheduled change 
over. 
Thr total CCC for the pump system, see fig. 7, indicates the various 
kinds of causes of the failure "pump system fails". 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present paper has described the strategy and the -nain steps of 
cause-consequence analysis based on the concept of critical events. The 
emphasis has been placed on application of the analysis strategy and the dis-
play format, the cause-consequence chart (CCC), to technical process sys-
tems. 
The same principle of analysis strategy may be used when analysing 
other types of problems involving potential disturbances of vital balances 
(e.g. ecologic and economic balances). 
The method has been applied in practice to several power plant systems 
at a detailed level. Future developments anticipated include semi-automation 
of CCC construction, and more detailed definition of the kind of component 
reliability models required for realistic systems analyses, such as those 
provided by studies of reliability physics. 
- 21 -
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APPKNIMX 
Description of the .symbols in the cause-consequence »hart 
1. I\ vent s 
[ i 
\ > 
9 
i 
T 
Initiating event (may be a critical event) 
Kvent 
Significant consequence 
Hasic condition 
Process symbol. Indicates an event which occupies ,t 
significant period of time. 
2. Event lines 
t 
V 
Event line with direction. The arrow may h*> omitted 
if the direction is obvious. 
Event line with "deterministic delav" (e.g. response 
time of a "denigned protective actum"). 
Event line with "»tochastu delay" (c.y. time to failure 
of a component or system). 
3. Condition gates 
AND-gate for conditions. 
Description (condition mm.nnirv) 
OH-gate for condition«. - 23 -
4. Gates for combining several ev*nt lines 
Inclusive OR-gate for join' of two event sequence*. 
Exclusive OR-gate for "join" of two event sequences. 
AND-gate for event sequences. 
5. Vertices for event lines 
Failure 
cen4iti«n 
9J 
i 
Nol Ye» 
TT 
r_l_n 
i i 
ij5J*»j 
TT 
AND-vertex. The event propagation wi:i continue in 
both directions. 
Either or - vertex. The vertex describes a "designed 
action/event". The event propagation follows the 
\"o-output if a failure condition is present. 
Condition-vertex. The vertex describes a condition. The 
event propagation follows the No-output if 'he condition 
is not fulfilled. 
Mutually exclusive, evhauxtive OH vertex for event' 
J^L _ 
I I I I I I Th* event propug»tu 
I I J indicated. Thin nytn 
)l( vert* for sporit.ineoui event,. 
ion moves in one of the directions 
ymbol follows either sfochislu tin <• 
delay or procea* symbols. - 24 -
6. Messages 
k 
"j Condition which is assumed to he fulfilled comment. 
7. Transfer symbols and possibilities for attachment of cause charts. 
Y 
Symbol for cause chart. 
If.-I 
I 
Cause chart n for critical event; may be shown 
separately in fig. -. 
if  No I Yet 
TT 
I fc System X 
^*1 fite 
Cause chart n (condition tree); may be shown 
separately in fig.-. 
Cause chart n (event tree) for the spontaneous 
event "system x fails" (specified on-line failure 
mode); may be shown separately in fig.-. 
ff-l 
Out-transfer. The event line is continued at the 
corresponding in-transfer symbol (*) at another 
place in the diagram (or in fig. - ). 
If.-I 
t 
In-transfer. The event line continue* from the 
corresponding out-tranefer symbol (s) (in the 
diagram or in fig. - ). 